"New Wine, Old Bottles, or both?: Regional Integration in the Mediterranean." In EURO-MED INTEGRATION AND THE 'RING OF FRIENDS': THE MEDITERRANEAN'S EUROPEAN CHALLENGE, VOL. IV" by Moxon-Browne, Edward.
NEW WINE,  OLD BOTTLES, OR BOTH? 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 
 
EDWARD MOXON-BROWNE 
 
Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the process of regional 
integration among the countries that border on  the Mediterranean. 
This objective immediately raises the question as to whether, and if 
so to what extent, the Mediterranean area constitutes a ‘region’ 
comparable to, for example, Latin America or  Western Europe. 
This question will be addressed at the outset; and then the prospects 
for integration will be considered in the light of theories that have 
been elaborated to ‘explain’ or ‘predict’ integration in other parts of 
the world. Such an analysis involves discussion of, inter alia, 
underlying motivations, background conditions, perceptions of key 
actors, and transnational interactions, not to mention the role of 
external actors whose intentions for the region may be as 
important, if not more important, than the ambitions, aspirations, 
achievements and actions of governments within the region.  
        
The Mediterranean is clearly a region in a geographical sense if in 
no other. Even at this level, however, it provides a rationale for 
concerns about security, it offers possibilities for intensification of 
trade relationships based on physical proximity, and it highlights 
the need for solutions, based on reciprocity, to common problems 
such as environmental pollution, illegal migration, conservation of 
marine resources, and communications networks. The extent to 
which a group of countries that are geographically proximate 
embark on a process of  regional integration normally reflects 
ambient economic and political realities. Thus the decisions of 
Mexico and Canada to join the North American Free Trade Area 
were taken in the context of an economic globalisation that 
compelled both countries, with some reluctance in each case and 
for different reasons, to capitalise on their existing geographical 
proximity and translate that proximity into an economic advantage. 
Likewise, the countries of east and central Europe who, prior  to 
1989, had led a separate economic and political existence despite 
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an advantage, and a rationale for their absorption into both NATO 
and the EU. Indeed, in both cases, enlargement has followed 
geographical proximity to a remarkable degree. The translation of 
geographical proximity into economic interdependence, political 
cooperation or a ‘security community’ is determined by a nexus of 
factors, some internal and some external, which alter perceptions. 
The thrust towards regional integration in the Mediterranean is 
anchored firmly in the current preoccupation with globalisation and 
the concomitant process of regionalisation.  If globalisation is 
defined in terms of technological change, increasingly mobile 
foreign investment, and a loosening of control that governments 
have hitherto been able  to  exert over firms and markets, then it 
follows that states will seek mutually supportive survival strategies. 
This need for survival is exacerbated by new threats accompanying 
globalisation: contemporary security issues that are now defined in 
demographic, ethnic, environmental and cultural terms. One 
obvious reaction to globalisation is a regionalisation whose basic 
rationale is survival rooted in geographical proximity. This 
regionalisation encompasses countries at different levels of 
development (eg NAFTA, Mercosur, ASEAN) and is not 
necessarily predicated on the notion of a ‘common civilisation’   
such as lay behind the Treaty of Rome and is now being 
consciously nurtured in the enlargement process of the EU towards 
eastern Europe. Regionalisation can be defined  as a process that 
leads to cooperation and the adoption of common rules, regulations 
and policies between states. This process can arise out of 
perceptions of economic advantage,  or enhanced security, that are 
based on the logic of geographical proximity.  The process is not 
automatic but must be nudged forward by conscious political 
decisions taken by actors who perceive the national interest as 
being best safeguarded in a regional setting. Evidence of growing 
interdependence, and subjective perceptions of an increasing sense 
of  regional identity  are both cause and effect of a crystallisation in 
regional cooperation. The role of external actors cannot be 
discounted. It is well-established that the early steps in West 
European integration were greatly encouraged, although sometimes 
reluctantly taken, by the insistence of the USA that Marshall aid 
should be distributed by Europeans themselves through institutions 
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in the Barcelona Process (discussed below) EU relations with the 
Mediterranean countries are based on expectations of intra-regional 
cooperation that exceed what is likely to be achieved in reality.       
 
Compared with other ‘regions’, the prospects for integration in the 
Mediterranean may be considered more problematic. Firstly, 
despite the fact  that different levels of economic development need 
not necessarily be a hindrance to the integration process, especially 
if these differences reflect a degree of complementarity,  the 
countries of the Mediterranean littoral exhibit wide divergences in  
GDP per capita combined with similar handicaps and mutually 
competing exports. These differences are reinforced by cultural 
contrasts: the Mediterranean stands at the intersection of at least 
three major religious traditions and although Huntington’s clash of 
civilisations may have been widely discounted in the international 
relations literature, it would be unwise to rule out the possibility 
that events outside the Mediterranean region may  impinge on the 
cultural interface that runs inside it. The benign scenario that 
portrays the Mediterranean as a cultural entrepot within which a 
dialogue between major civilisations can, and must, take place, is 
plausible but it cannot be take for granted.  Secondly, there is an 
inherent danger that attempts to create a Mediterranean regional 
identity  based on economic cooperation will be perceived as 
suspect in Arab countries. On the one hand, the creation of a 
Mediterranean identity risks dividing the Arab world between those 
involved in that process, and those who are not; and, on the other 
hand, any  set of relationships based on economic interdependence 
in this context cannot help being asymmetrical (Joffe 2001)  given 
the north-south dynamic that underpins the whole process. Thirdly, 
some Islamic states are themselves prey to internal schisms and 
fluid notions of national identity in which, in particular, the 
tensions between secular and religious conceptions of the state are 
as yet unresolved. Fourthly, although it is rarely articulated in 
Euro-Med communiqués, the fate of Mediterranean regional 
integration is not unconnected to the fate of the “road map” in the 
Middle East. The twists and turns in this political cartography are 
inextricably linked to the prospects for navigating successfully the 
economic shoals and sharks that lurk beneath the unfolding 
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of September 11 and, in particular, the redefinition of US foreign 
policy, may make the process that the EU is trying to promote in 
the Mediterranean all but impossible. Much depends on how, and 
to what extent, the EU and the United States are able to work as 
partners in mitigating the Middle East crisis specifically, and the 
alleged threat of “international terror” more generally. The United 
States now views the world, but especially the Middle East, 
through a new lens, and one consequence of this is a reluctance on 
the part of Washington to support, even tacitly, EU attempts to 
moderate or mollify extreme political regimes in the “outer ring”: 
Iran, Syria, Iraq.          
 
Regional integration theory: an overview  
 
We turn now to consider four theoretical perspectives that have 
made a contribution to an understanding of regional integration: 
federalism, neofunctionalism, transactionalism, and social 
constructivism. Clearly, this is not an exhaustive list but, as will be 
argued later, these perspectives seem most likely to throw light on 
the progress (or otherwise) of regional integration in the 
Mediterranean area.   
 
Federalism is perhaps the oldest of the theoretical frameworks 
within which the European integration process has been examined 
and analysed. However, federalism can be distinguished from other  
conceptual approaches in a number of ways.  Firstly, federalism has 
been as much a political project as a purely academic 
preoccupation. Secondly, therefore, its proponents and practitioners 
have been politicians and political scientists, with the result that its 
appeal and its profile have been broader than theories such as 
neofunctionalism or transactionalism (both of which are discussed 
below). Thirdly, federalism is an elastic concept which means, for 
some observers at least, that it can be dangerously ambiguous or a 
sort of “concept for all seasons,” from which protagonists of 
opposing views can draw sustenance. At its heart, federalism 
connotes the separation of political authority at distinct levels but 
the way in which this is done, and the consequences of doing so, 
can be very variable. By maintaining a balance between central and 
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power to the ‘centre’ (a British view, for example, of federalism in 
its EU context) or one might equally feel that the allocation of 
authority to the regions is excessive (for example, in cases where 
such regional authority prevents progress being made on issues that 
are widely regarded as desirable in the territories of the other 
federalised units). For the purposes of our discussion here, 
however, the emphasis of federalists is on institutions. Unlike 
(neo)functionalists who see political boundaries being blurred, 
federalists view them as being delineated more clearly and their 
relationship to each other more clearly defined albeit in a new way. 
Thus the institutions of the EU (Parliament, Court and 
Commission) are perceived by federalists as being necessary 
prerequisites for the emergence of a more integrated political 
system at the European level. Federalism is about politics, and it 
assumes that society needs the security of institutions, and defined 
power allocations, in contrast to neofunctionalists who see society 
as being malleable and open to persuasion towards new foci of 
loyalty and new sources of authority. Clearly, the distinction 
between federalism and functionalism is not watertight in the sense 
that neofunctionalists see the supranational aspects of EU 
institutions as being the objects of new  loyalties, as well as 
vehicles through which new transnational policies are formulated 
and implemented. The federalist belief that institutions can be 
flexible enough to cater for integration in a region characterised 
more by diversity than homogeneity is relevant to our discussion 
although the historical record does not support the view that 
federalism is always, or even often,  a sufficient mechanism for 
overcoming deeply divided societies. Federalism in Nigeria or 
Rhodesia/Nyasaland has not been an encouraging role-model.   
 
Functionalist and neo-functionalist theories have probably been 
more influential than any other for offering a discourse within 
which regional integration processes are initiated, sustained and 
challenged. Concepts such as ”spillover” and the modes of thinking 
along the lines of “transferring loyalties” to new centres, and 
seeking the right “background conditions” have permeated our 
thinking and have affected theoretical insights into the integration 
process far beyond the boundaries of neofunctional orthodoxy, or 
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is rife with schisms, and revisionism. At its heart, neofunctionalism 
is based on a number of guiding principles: firstly, an emphasis on 
incremental cooperation starting with non-contentious but 
significant sectors and a preference for economics over politics; 
secondly, the desirability of guiding the process through 
supranational institutions thus removing the key decisions from the 
emotive arena of national politics; thirdly, the integration of 
strategic economic sectors leading inexorably to the integration of 
related sectors until such time that the economic sectors are so 
intertwined that the desire (and capacity) for conflict will have 
disappeared (or at least the cost/benefit ratios of conflict and 
consensus will have tilted irrevocably towards the latter); fourthly, 
as supranational authority is increased by being effective, the 
loyalties of decision-makers and the people they represent will shift 
outside the national arena; fifthly, as economic integration deepens 
it will require further institutional elaboration to sustain or extend 
it; sixthly, therefore, political integration is perceived as being 
inevitable and consequential to economic integration. The advent 
of the Single Market (SEM) in 1993 in the EU illustrates some of 
these points. The Cockburn White Paper of 1985 (that later became 
the legislative basis for the SEM) proposed nearly 300 measures 
that would be necessary to bring about the SEM. Each of these 
measures was in itself unobjectionable but cumulatively they added 
up to a transformation of the EU economy. In order to bring about 
these measures, however, other institutional measures were needed 
and these appeared in, although they were not the primary reason 
for, the signing of the Single European Act in 1986 and the Treaty 
of Maastricht in 1992. Neofunctionalism is therefore neatly 
reflected in the image of Gulliver in the land of Lilliput where he 
was tied to the ground by hundreds of threads each of which he 
could have easily broken, but which, collectively and cumulatively, 
held  him  prisoner. If we transpose ‘national sovereignty’ for 
Gulliver we can envisage hundreds of EU directives helping to 
render national sovereignty helpless in the face of a labyrinthine 
European  acquis! What also emerges from the neofunctionalist 
perspective is the emphasis on welfare: high politics is kept out of 
the picture as long as possible and then gently subsumed into a 
pattern of irreversible cooperation that already exists. 
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identified most closely with the work of Karl Deutsch and places 
emphasis on the amounts of communication between national units. 
The early work of Deutsch on nation-building (Deutsch 1966)     
portrayed emerging national identity as essentially the 
intensification of communication. At the supranational level, 
Deutsch saw essentially the same mobilisation process taking place 
whereby intensified interactions between national communities 
fostered a sense of trust and hence a feeling of security. 
International integration was thus seen to be a process whereby 
nations eschewed the use of violence as a means of resolving 
disputes.  For Deutsch there were two types of security community: 
the ‘amalgamated’ and the ‘pluralistic’. The amalgamated security 
community involved the formal merger of separate political  units 
(usually states) into a larger unit through some kind of institutional 
fusion; while a pluralistic security community was seen to be 
composed of entities where the constituent governments remained 
separate and where there was no overarching authority to control or 
distribute resources. These models approximate to federations or 
confederations, respectively, or more accurately to the distinction 
between gemeinschaft (a community) and gesellschaft (a society). 
Whereas the latter model seems less integrated than the former, it is 
according to Deutsch more likely to survive the various external 
and internal challenges to which such integrated entities are prone 
such as global shocks; or the uneven distribution of benefits within 
the integrated community. A gemeinschaft is based on a feeling of 
kinship, the development of ‘we-feelings’, while a gesellschaft is 
based on more utilitarian motivations and relationships that are 
more rational than emotional. As long as the bargains that lie at the 
base of a gesellschaft are not unduly disturbed, it will survive. 
There is scope for negotiating solutions to conflicts; and by 
upgrading the common interest a conflict does not necessarily have 
a zero-sum outcome.  In other words, its members expect less and 
are therefore content with less, than might be the case in a 
gemeinschaft where betrayals of mutual loyalty are potentially 
more harmful, and more difficult to repair, if only because there is 
less ‘space’ for mutual readjustment and conflicts do tend to result 
in zero-sum outcomes. Deutsch placed greatest reliance on the 
interactions (or ‘transactions’) between societies as  indicators of 
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reflection of the amount of transactions between two societies. This 
could be most usefully expressed as a percentage of transactions 
with third countries, Thus, if trade between A and B is rising more 
rapidly than the trade between A or B with C, one could see the 
level of mutual relevance between A and B as being on the 
increase. What Deutsch did not appreciate enough, perhaps, was 
that the intrinsic value of the interactions was important. On the eve 
of Word War I, for example, it is known that interactions between 
Germany and Britain were of increasing intensity but the result was 
war. On the other hand, rising trade between Britain and the EEC in 
the 1960s led eventually to British accession  to the Community.  
            
Constructivism has become increasingly influential within 
international relations and, by extension, and more recently, in the 
field of European integration. Although there are now various 
constructivist approaches which generate their own internal 
discourses,  the common denominator is a belief that the structures  
of world politics are social rather than material, or more subjective 
than objective. State identities for example are, therefore from this 
perspective not static but dynamic, variable, fluid, and constantly 
changing. (Knutsen 1997:281-2).  Constructivists treat interests as 
socially constructed, as derivatives of processes of social 
interaction. Likewise identities are socially constructed so that an 
actor’s interpretation of reality around him is based on interactions. 
All this challenges much of the contemporary theoretical literature 
on European integration: any theory that privileges the state, or 
institutions, or interests, imposes constraints and pre-selects 
priorities. The researcher needs to think more about ideas, shared 
beliefs, general discourses, and the outcomes of communication 
between individual actors.  
 
The implications of integration theory for the Mediterranean  
             
In this final section we reflect on the implications of regional 
integration theory for the Mediterranean. There at least four major 
themes to be considered: “background conditions”; the prospects 
for neofunctionalist “spillover”; the role of institutions; and the role 
of  ‘external actors’ in the integration process. 
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Mediterranean area (Calleya 2000; Attina 2002). We have noted 
already that three religious traditions intersect in the Mediterranean 
basin, as do a multiplicity of political systems and ideologies, not 
to mention wide disparities in economic and social development. 
Kahmann (2001) has noted that the Human Development Index 
(HDI) rankings, for example, in the Mediterranean  exhibit wide 
gaps . The HDI is composed by the United Nations annually and is 
an aggregate measure of life expectancy, adult literacy, educational 
participation rates at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, and 
GDP per capita. In these rankings Sweden, Belgium and the 
Netherlands rank 4, 5 and 8 respectively while Algeria Egypt and 
Morocco rank 100, 105, and 112 . There is however a small overlap 
between the EU and the Mediterranean inasmuch as Israel, and 
Cyprus, rank above Portugal. Neofunctionalists have been 
especially concerned with background conditions although Deutsch 
did not neglect this concept in his analysis of the circumstances in 
which transactions and levels of mutual trust might evolve between 
communities that were integrating. Haas, however, faced with the 
familiar conundrum as to why integration had proceeded much 
further in Europe than elsewhere in the world, asserted that   
background conditions were a key part of the explanation. For Haas 
(1961) there were three key features that were likely to encourage 
regional integration: pluralistic social structures; substantial 
economic development, and ‘common ideological patterns’ among 
the participating units. In addition to these features, Haas believed 
that the integration process was also facilitated by the existence of 
supranational agencies with specific competences to upgrade the 
common interest. Moreover, if mass opinion was cognisant and, 
therefore supportive, of the benefits of integration, the process 
could potentially ‘spill over’ into new sectors. Reflecting later 
writing by Taylor (1993) which exploits consociational theory to 
argue that national elites espouse and control integration to 
preserve and bolster their own  predominance in the national arena, 
Haas saw regional integration as most likely to prosper if it was 
clearly identified with, and led by, rational national actors 
following policies linked to perceptions of their own best interests. 
Later refinements of Haas’ work on background conditions 
included a new emphasis on the importance of perceptions as a 
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Nye (1971), for example, suggested, firstly, that expectations of the 
benefits flowing from integration would be vital; secondly, he saw 
perceptions of external threat as being helpful; and thirdly if the 
costs of integration were deemed to be low it was more likely that 
elites would pursue policies conducive to deeper integration 
irrespective of, or at least with less concern for, the alleged 
benefits.   
            
In the context of the Mediterranean region, these theoretical 
observations on background conditions have mixed implications. 
Clearly, if social, political and economic homogeneity among the 
units to be integrated is essential, the prospects for integration 
within the Mediterranean, or even between the Mediterranean and 
the EU, are rather unpromising. The fact that all the governments 
of the original Six were of a Christian Democratic complexion is 
often cited as one reason for their easy integration in the Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) and later the European Economic 
Community (EEC) but it must be remembered also that diversity 
(or complementarity) can also be propitious. The need for an 
extended market for its industrial exports made the development of 
the EEC (and the later Single Market) a logical policy goal for 
West Germany in the 1960s. Likewise, the need for an extended 
market for its agricultural surpluses made the EEC’s Common 
Agricultural Policy a logical objective for France. The reciprocity 
between French and German interests has always been at the core 
of the European integration project and this lends some support to 
the argument that reciprocity (based more on complementarity   
than similarity) can be helpful to the integration process. 
Perceptions of benefits that may flow from the integration project 
are also central to its future prospects in the Mediterranean. 
However, such perceptions argue more strongly in favour of EU-
Mediterranean integration than intra-Mediterranean convergence 
On its part, the EU sees the Barcelona process as a matter of 
stabilisation on its southern frontier, as a means to control 
migration or render it less necessary, and as a way of enhancing its 
influence in the Middle East. For the southern Mediterranean 
countries in particular the Barcelona process is essentially about 
economic development and increased prospects for trade: the bulk 
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of the region, giving rise to a familiar “hub and spoke” pattern of 
economic activity that is not conducive to integration in the region 
itself.   From the point of view of perceptions one could argue 
therefore that the EU-Mediterranean process is based on reciprocal 
interests being served. There are however other perceptions that 
may militate against greater integration: divergent views on the 
Middle East that go deeper than mere foreign policy options;  a 
reluctance to implement some of the societal changes advocated by 
the EU; a reluctance that reflects a deeper suspicion of Eurocentric 
cultural imperialism;  and intra-Mediterranean rivalry between 
countries enjoying differentially advantageous bilateral ties with 
the  EU.  
 
The prospects for the quintessentially neofunctionalist concept of 
‘spillover’ lie at the heart of many of the European Unions’s 
relationships with third countries. The ALFA programme provides 
educational and technical expertise in Latin America; the TEMPUS 
programme has been concerned with educational mobility in east 
and central Europe, while the PHARE programme has underpinned 
the infrastuctural framework for enlargement in the same region. 
The two latter programmes act as partners to, and supporters of, the 
intensification of trade and investment flows between the two parts 
of Europe. Although not an EU applicant, Norway receives the 
benefits of the Socrates student exchange programme. More 
recently (2003) Turkey has begun to participate in a Jean Monnet 
scheme providing one-year internships for Turkish nationals in EU 
countries, thus preparing them to play a role in their own country’s 
integration into the EU.  
             
At a more modest level, the modus operandi of the Barcelona 
process lends some credence to the idea that different segments of 
the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean are 
interdependent although the assumption must be that progress will 
be easier in some areas than others. For that reason, sectors are kept 
reasonably distinct. At the apex of the functional divisions, there 
are institutions (perhaps too strong a word) to which authority for 
promoting progress and monitoring difficulties is allocated. The 
principal mechanism through which the Barcelona process is 
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established by the Barcelona Declaration signed in 1995 at a 
meeting attended by the fifteen members of the EU and twelve 
Mediterranean countries. The Partnership spans not only a wide 
range of countries but also a wide range of issues. The political and 
security chapter can be regarded as ambitious in that it calls on 
signatories to  uphold democratic values such as good governance, 
human rights, the rule of law, pluralism and self-determination, and 
support the legitimacy of the state itself. With a view to creating a 
zone of peace and security, the members commit themselves to 
security-building measures. The chapter on society and culture 
emphasises the development of human resources, dialogue and 
respect between different cultures and religions, and toleration 
amongst minorities within Mediterranean societies. The key 
chapter is the economic one where the year 2010 is the target date 
for the achievement of a Mediterranean free trade area involving 
the gradual reduction of tariff barriers, and programmes of 
economic assistance. The principal instrument for economic 
assistance is MEDA. The first MEDA programme (MEDA I) 
provided 3400 million euro for the period 1996-1999; and was 
succeeded by MEDA II (2000-2006) which has been allocated 
5350 million euro and concentrates on the preparation of partners 
for the implementation of free trade agreements and on integration 
among the Mediterranean countries themselves. The overall aim is 
to create the right conditions for increased trade within and 
between the region and the EU, and to stimulate foreign direct 
investment. The progress of free trade is based on a series of 
bilateral agreements between the EU and partner countries in the 
region (all partners except Syria now have such agreements). The 
development of trade pacts within the region has been much slower 
although the Agadir Agreement between Egypt, Jordan, Morocco 
and Tunisia which was initialled in January 2003 is a step in this 
direction. Speaking on 17 January 2003, Commissioner Lamy 
conceded that the “South-South dimension”of the Mediterranean 
region needed to be enhanced but that the Agadir Agreement was a 
“decisive building block in this respect”. To coordinate the EU-
Mediterranean Partnership there is a fairly light institutional 
structure. The principal steering body of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership is the Euro-Mediterranean Committee which consists 
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the High Representative of the CFSP, and the European 
Commission) plus a representative of each Mediterranean partner 
country. It is chaired by the Council Presidency. In addition, 
foreign ministers meet periodically to review progress and plan 
future strategy. Ad hoc ministerial conferences deal with sectoral 
issues and conferences for senior officials, civil society 
representatives and parliamentarians are held to address specific 
policy issues. A Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum holds 
annual sessions and provides a space where civil society can debate 
the broad goals and priorities of the Barcelona Process. This 
policy-making structure and the interweaving of political, 
economic, security, and cultural themes in the Barcelona Process 
reflect both the federalist tenet that institutions are necessary to 
coordinate the integration process and the neofunctionslist credo 
that political problems are made more tractable by increasing 
economic interdependence. At the heart of neofunctionalism there 
is the assumption that if states are heavily involved with each other 
through trade and  investment, the costs of conflict are increased as 
are the rewards of consensus. In May 2003 President Prodi 
announced two further refinements for the Barcelona Process 
which strengthen the interdependence of political, cultural and 
economic relationships in the Mediterranean Basin. A Euro-
Mediterranean Bank will enhance a sense of “co-ownership” in the 
region and will reinforce the amount and the quality of economic 
assistance being offered. Likewise a Foundation for Dialogue 
Between Cultures is intended to ameliorate societal cleavages that 
hamper economic integration and political pluralism.“It is crucial” 
Prodi continued “that we focus on awareness of diversity and 
acceptance of the ‘other’ especially among the young. Within the 
Union we must look for new solutions – solutions that are positive 
– for dealing with problems of immigration. We must link the issue 
of immigration and relations between different cultures to the 
fundamental values of European citizenship. We must reach out to 
the workplace and schools, and get our message across in the 
media”(Euromed Report 22 May 2003).   
 
If it is true, as neofunctionalists have argued, that integration ‘spills 
over’ from economic interdependence to other types of integration, 
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privilege north-south integration at the expense of south-south 
interactions. There are several reasons why this is so. Firstly, the 
underlying assumption of the Barcelona process that all partners 
are equally committed to regional cooperation as a means of 
achieving stability and security has been undermined by sharply  
divergent attitudes towards the Middle East. Secondly, if it is true 
as neofunctionalists believe that regional integration takes place 
most easily between countries characterised by pluralism and 
liberal democracy embedded in a free market economy, there is 
again a mixture of political regime in the Mediterranean area that 
militates against such a transformation. Indeed one writer has gone 
further and argued that the EU is not really interested in 
encouraging democratic transformation in the southern 
Mediterranean because it would lead to too much instability and the  
menace of more overtly islamist governments:  
 
Even though the EU would not regret the overthrow of any of the 
non-democratic regimes in the region, it fears the period of 
transition that would follow such an overthrow. In all non-
democratic MTCs the democratic elite is small and weak  so it can 
be presumed that the democrats would not have the strength to 
replace the old regimes immediately. Chaos, civil war or takeover 
by radical Islamists – these are the threats as perceived by the EU 
(Junemann, A. in Xuereb P.G. 1998:115)   
 
Finally, we consider the role of external actors in the regional 
integration process. In principle there are two possibilities here. On 
the one hand we can envisage an external actor encouraging a 
regional grouping to coalesce in order to provide additional 
security and commercial benefits. The United States is widely and 
correctly assumed to have been interested in, and a strong advocate 
of, European regional intgration in the 1950s partly because Europe 
would provide a security “buffer” against the Soviet Union, and 
partly because the United States needed a bloc with which to trade, 
and in which to invest. On the other hand we can envisage an 
external actor participating itself in the integration process.  The 
EU seems to play that role in the Mediterranean. Although some lip 
service is paid to the idea of the Mediterranean qua Mediterranean 
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creating a zone of cooperation and stability in which it plays a 
leading part. The fact is that the bulk of the trade in the 
Mediterranean is with the EU and relatively little is conducted 
among the Mediterranean littoral states themselves. The relatively 
disappointing record so far of intra-Mediterranean collaboration 
should not surprise us: the efforts to produce a Central European 
Free Trade Area in the 1990s fell on deaf ears as each CEEC 
competed to strengthen its links with the external actor – the 
European Union. Likewise, EU rhetoric regarding the Balkan 
stability programme is couched in terms of self-reliance, regional 
cooperation and transnational contacts all with a view to promoting 
the desirability of “greater integration” in the Balkan region. The 
truth is that the Balkan states don’t want to integrate with each 
other. They are more interested in, and will benefit more obviously 
from, integration with the EU. Hence the efforts of Croatia (for 
example) but later Serbia-Montenegro to pursue relentlessly the 
path towards EU membership.    
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